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1.  Introduction 
 
Wh-words that range over individuals can escape weak islands, such as factive 
and negative islands, while wh-words ranging over manners or degrees cannot:   
 
(1)  a.   *How do you regret that John behaved?   Factive island 
b.   Who do you regret that John invited? 
 
(2)  a.   *How many children don’t you have?    Negative island 
b.   Who didn’t you invite? 
 
Fox and Hackl (2007), (partly based on Kuno and Takami 1997) have showed that 
negative  degree  islands  such  as  (2a)  above  become  perfectly  acceptable  if  we 
place an existential modal in the scope of the negation, or a universal modal above 
the negation:  
 
(3)  a.   How many children are you not allowed to have?  
b.   How many children are you required not to have? 
 
We might observe that the same pattern obtains with negative manner questions if 
we place an existential modal in the scope of negation (cf. 4a). Further, attitude 
verbs above negation can obviate the island effect as well, as shown in (4b): 
 
(4)  a.   How was John not allowed to behave? 
b.  How fast do you hope that Bill did not drive? 
 
For most speakers, factive islands can be also significantly ameliorated by placing 
an existential modal in the scope of a factive verb: 
 
(5)  ?How do you regret that John was allowed to behave? 
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These  facts  pose  a  serious  challenge  for  any  account  that  argues  that  the 
intervention is caused by some syntactic property of negation or factive verbs (cf. 
the Relativised Minimality of Rizzi 1990 and much subsequent work), because it 
is rather unclear why adding an extra structural element such as a modal or an 
attitude verb should be able to obviate any syntactic intervention creating property 
that negation and factives might have. Further, we also need an explanation as to 
why precisely these modals and attitude verbs create the obviation effects, but not 
others. Universal modals in the scope of negation e.g. do not create obviation, as 
shown below (cf. also Fox and Hackl 2007): 
 
(6)  *How fast is John not required to drive? 
 
It seems then that a semantic account for the island effects created by factives and 
negation is simply inevitable.  
Interestingly enough however, despite a number of semantic proposals for 
weak  islands,  an  explanation  that  is  able  to  account  for  the  different  types  of 
factive and negative islands as well as their obviation facts has not been available 
so far. While Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993, 1997) offer a very elaborate account for 
intervention created by quantifiers and negation, their proposal for factive islands 
remains somewhat tentative. Neither do they notice the obviation facts discussed 
above, and hence they do not offer any explanation for them either. Honcoop’s 
(1998) proposal is tailored for the Germanic what-for split, and is not clear that it 
is extendable to classic islands nor the obviation facts. At the same time, negative 
degree islands have enjoyed a great deal of specialized attention (Rullmann 1995, 
Fox and Hackl 2007), the latter offering an ingenious solution for the obviation 
problem in the case of  negative degree questions as well,  yet it has remained 
unclear whether these accounts can be extended to negative islands that arise with 
other extractees (e.g. islands created by manners), or to other types of islands, e.g. 
islands  created  by  factives.  Indeed  Rullmann  (1995)  expresses  skepticism  that 
such a unified account is at all possible. Fox (2007) laid out a blueprint as for the 
conditions that an analysis of negative islands created by manner questions would 
have to fulfill, but himself does not provide such an analysis, nor does he discuss 
the  case  of  factive  islands.  Finally,  we  might  mention  Oshima  (2006),  who 
proposed a partial account for certain cases of factive islands, yet his account does 
not extend to factive islands with degree questions, nor to the negative islands nor 
the obviation facts. 
The present paper proposes a new semantic account for factive and other 
presuppositional islands that is easily extendable to negative islands as well. The 
central claim I make is that these islands arise because they are predicted to lead 
to a contradiction at some level. It is proposed that factive islands arise because 
manner and degree questions—but not questions about individuals—stand with a 
presupposition that is contradictory. As no context can entail a contradictory set of 
propositions, these questions always lead to presupposition failure. In the case of 
negative islands a contradiction arises in a different manner: I will observe that in 
these questions the condition according to which questions must have a unique 
most informative answer (cf. Dayal 1996) cannot be met. Therefore, any complete 
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(exhaustive) answer to such questions is bound to state a contradiction. I argue 
that the reason why a contradiction arises in the case of manner and degree islands 
is  based  on  two  independently  motivated  assumptions  about  the  domain  of 
manners and degrees
1. The first is that the domain of manners contains contraries. 
The  second  is  that  degree  predicates  relate  individuals  to  intervals  (cf. 
Schwarzschild and Wilkinson 2002, Heim 2006). Thus according to this proposal 
the  compositional  semantics  of  questions  supplies  everything  we  need  for  the 
explanation  of  presuppositional  and  negative  questions,  without  invoking  any 
further special rules. The paper makes a couple of further novel empirical claims 
as well. I propose that the account for factive islands can be extended to other 
islands  created  by  presuppositional  items:  extraposition  islands,  and  certain 
adverbial  interveners.  I  also  notice  the  fact  that  we  can  observe  a  correlation 
between presupposition strength and the strength of islandhood: I show that this is 
the case in the case of extraposition islands and adverbial interveners.  
 
 
2.  Presuppositional Islands 
 
2.1.  Presuppositions of Questions: Questions about Individuals 
 
In this section it is observed that questions which contain a variable in the scope 
of  a  factive  item  are  naturally  understood  in  a  way  which  suggests  that  their 
presupposition  projects  in  a  universal  manner.  I  also  discuss  certain  apparent 
counterexamples to this generalization, and argue that in these cases we are in fact 
dealing  with  a  special  type  of  identity  questions,  in  the  case  of  which  the 
presupposition projected is simply invariant.  
Let’s start by examining questions about individuals containing a variable 
in the scope of a factive verb such as regret: 
 
(7)  Who among these ten people does Mary regret that Bill invited? 
 
Heim (1992) has argued that x regrets that p triggers the presupposition that x 
believes that p. In other words the presupposition of regret requires that every 
belief world of the subject is such that it entails p. Given this, the denotation of the 
question above will look as follows: 
 
(8)  [[  (7) ]] 
w=  p. x [x {these ten people} & p=  w’.Mary regrets that Bill 
invited x in w’] 
 
What does the question in (7) presuppose? Empirically, it seems to presuppose 
that  for  every  x  in  the  given  domain,  Mary  believes  that  Bill  invited  x.  We 
observe then that the projection pattern with factive verbs is universal. In the case 
of  a  question  about  individuals  the  context  can  easily  satisfy  the  set  of 
                                                            
1Similarly to Sz&Z, I will not dicuss islands that arise with why-questions. The reason for this is 
that there is independent evidence that why-adjuncts in fact independently favor late insertion/ 
high attachment in the structure, cf. e.g. Ko (2005). 
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presuppositions  that  the  question  has  because  the  presuppositions  of  the 
alternatives are independent from each other. Note also that similar data about 
universal projection in constituent questions were observed in Guerzoni (2003)
2. 
  The  universal  projection  seems  also  to  be  at  the  heart  of  the  contrast 
discovered in Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993) between questions about individuals 
with  a  predicate  that  can  be  iterated  vs.  questions  that  contain one  time  only 
predicates:  
 
(9)  a.         To whom do you regret having shown this letter? 
 b.  *From whom do you regret having gotten this letter? 
 
Observe  that  the  difference  between  the  two  questions  above  can  be  easily 
explained  under  the  assumption  that  indeed  the  projection  pattern  of  the 
presuppositions  is  universal.  Given  such  a  pattern,  the  example  in  (9a) 
presupposes that you have shown the letter to a number of people—which is an 
unproblematic presupposition. According to the universal projection pattern, the 
example in (9b) will likewise presuppose that you have gotten this letter from a 
number of people: This condition however is impossible to meet, since get is a 
one time only predicate, and (on the distributive reading that we are after here) it 
is only possible to get a letter from a single sender. In other words, the problem 
with  (9b)  stems  from  the  fact  that  it  stands  with  a  presupposition  that  is 
impossible for any context to satisfy. 
Interestingly, in certain cases it is possible to obviate the above effect: 
 
(10)      Who is the one that you regret having gotten this letter from? 
 
This example is grammatical, despite the one-time only predicate contained in the 
question. Why should that be? First observe that the question above is understood 
as an identity question, in other words it is concerned about the identity of a 
particular individual, one that is already salient in the context.  
 
(11)   a.   p. x [p=  w’. x=  y. you regret that you got the letter from y in w’] 
          b. ‘For what x, x=  y such that you regret you got the letter from y?’ 
 
Since the identity question contains a definite description, now in fact we have 
two presuppositions embedded in each other: the uniqueness presupposition of the 
definite description, and the factive presupposition triggered by regret:  
 
(12)  Who is  [uniqueness pres the one that you [factive pres regret having gotten this 
letter from]]? 
                                                            
2As Anna Szabolcsi (pc.) pointed out to me, we find weaker presupposition projection pattern with 
certain predicates such as stop smoking: 
(1)  Which of your friends has stopped smoking?  
 However, we might observe that predicates such as stop smoking are independently known to be 
weak triggers:  
(2)  I notice you are chewing on your pencil. Have you recently stopped smoking? (example  
due to B. Geurts) 
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Moreover,  we  might  observe  that  the  factive  presupposition  trigger  is  in  the 
restrictor of the definite description, as shown below:  
 
(13)  the one [ that you factive pres regret having gotten this letter from]  is Bill 
 
However, it is an independently  known fact that presuppositions embedded in 
restrictors of quantifiers project weakly or not at all (cf. Schlenker 2006). This can 
be observed in examples such as the one in (14) below, which does not seem to 
stand with the inference that all of these ten boys are incompetent: 
 
(14)  (of these 10 boys) No one [who is aware that he is incompetent] applied 
 
In  the  case  of  (10)  then  the  factive  presupposition  that  is  embedded  in  the 
restrictor of the definite description fails to project, and it is only the uniqueness 
presupposition  of  the  definite  description  that  projects.  Since  the  uniqueness 
presupposition is invariant, the question itself will only presuppose that there is a 
unique  individual  which  you  regret  having  gotten  the  letter  from.  This 
presupposition  in  turn  can  be  easily  satisfied  in  any  context,  and  hence  the 
question is acceptable. 
 
2.2.  Presuppositional Islands with Factive Verbs 1: Questions about Manners 
Similarly to one time only predicates, manner questions that contain a variable in 
the scope of the factive verb are predicted to always stand with a contradictory set 
of presuppositions. As there can be no context that satisfies the presupposition of 
these questions, they always result in a presupposition failure.  
The crucial assumption that I would like to introduce is that the domain of 
manners always contains contraries. The observation that predicates have contrary 
oppositions dates back to Aristotle’s study of the square of opposition and the 
nature  of  logical  relations.  (cf.  Horn  (1989)  for  a  historical  survey  and  a 
comprehensive  discussion  of  the  distinction  btw.  contrary  and  contradictory 
oppositions,  as  well  as  Gajewski  (2005)  for  a  more  recent  discussion  of  the 
linguistic significance of contrariety). Contrariety is relation that holds between 
two  statements  that  cannot  be  simultaneously  true,  though  they  may  be 
simultaneously false. A special class of contraries are contradictories, which not 
only  cannot  be  simultaneously  true,  but  they  cannot  be  simultaneously  false 
either.  Natural  language  negation  is  usually  taken  to  yield  contradictory 
statements (cf. e.g. Horn 1989). I will claim that every manner predicate has at 
least  one  contrary  in  the  domain  of  manners  (which  is  not  a  contradictory). 
Further, the context might implicitly restrict the domain of manners, just as the 
domain of individuals, but for any member in the set  {P, P’}, the other two 
members are alternatives to it in any context. Some examples of such pairs are 
{wisely, unwisely}, {fast, slowly}, {by bus, by car}, etc.  
Given the simple and rather natural assumption that the domain of manners 
always  contains  contraries,  manner  questions  that  contain  a  factive  verb  are 
predicted however to presuppose a contradiction. Let’s look at the example below:  
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(15)  *How does Mary regret that John fixed the car? 
 
Since the alternative propositions in the H/K denotation of the question range over 
a set of manners that contains contraries, a universal projection pattern for the 
presupposition embedded in the question predicts that the question presupposes a 
set of propositions that are contradictory: 
  
(16)  [[  How does Mary regret that John fixed the car? ]] 
w 
  =  p.   [  DM & p= w’. Mary regrets that John fixed the car in   in w’] 
 
(17)  Projected presupposition of the question in (15): 
            for every manner   DM: M. believes that J. fixed the car in   
   for every manner   DM: M. believes that J.’s car fixing event e* was in   
 
Recall that manner questions are understood as asking about a particular event, 
which in this case means that the proposition embedded under the attitude verb is 
understood as describing a particular event e*. However, it is not possible for a 
single event to be an element of all the manners in a given domain of manners, 
because  these  domains  always  contain  contraries,  as  it  was  argued  above. 
Therefore it is not possible for John to have fixed the car in all the ways given in 
the context, and as a consequence the question in (15) will always presuppose that 
Mary has an incoherent set of beliefs. 
Interestingly, the island violations above can be improved. The first way to 
improve these questions is shown by the examples below: 
 
(18)    What is the manner in which John regrets that Mary fixed the car? 
 
Such  examples  are  often  described  as  involving  D-linking,  which  tends  to 
improve the acceptability of weak islands. What I would like to suggest is that in 
these cases again we are dealing with identity questions, the denotation of which 
can be represented as below
3: 
 
(19)   p.   [  DM & p= w’:   =    s.t. M regrets that J fixed the car in   in w’] 
            ‘For what manner  ,  =    such that M regrets that J fixed the car in  ?’ 
 
The factive presupposition is again embedded in the restrictor of the definite 
description: 
  
(20)  the manner [ such that M. regrets that J. fixed the car that way]   is     
 
                                                            
3Note  that  this  explanation  for  the  D-linking  effect  is  dependent  on  there  being  a  syntactic 
difference between the D-linked and the non-D-linked questions, i.e. it depends on the presence of 
the definite description at LF. I am therefore lead to assume that the LF representation even of the 
examples (if they indeed exist) in which a D-linking effect can observed without an overt definite 
description is in fact similar to that in (19), in other words that they contain a covert definite 
description.  
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Since the projection pattern from the restrictors of quantifiers is very weak, as 
discussed e.g. in Schlenker (2006), the embedded factive presupposition will not 
project, only the presupposition of the definite  description, which is invariant. 
Therefore the presupposition that the question stands with is not contradictory. 
Finally, note that the explanation for the above example remains the same for an 
analogous question with a resumptive NP, such as the one below: 
 
(21)  What is the manner such that John has fixed the car that way? 
 
  The second way of ameliorating factive island violations is by existential 
modals: as it was mentioned in the introduction of this paper, for most speakers, 
factive islands can be significantly ameliorated by placing an existential modal in 
the scope of a factive verb: 
 
(22)  ?How do you regret that John was allowed to behave? 
 
Indeed the present approach predicts that a modal in the scope of a factive should 
ameliorate factive islands. The reason is that now the projected presuppositions 
are in fact not contradictory. Consider the question in (22) above: This question 
only stands with the presupposition that for every manner, John was allowed to 
behave in that manner, which is not a contradictory set of propositions. Since the 
set of propositions that the question presupposes is not contradictory, the context 
can easily satisfy it, and therefore the question is acceptable.  
 
2.3.  Presuppositional Islands with Factive Verbs 2: Degree Questions
4 
 
The crucial  tenet  on  which  the  explanation  of  the  island  sensitivity  of  degree 
islands rests is the idea that degree questions range over intervals. In other words, 
following the proposals advanced in Schwarzschild and Wilkinson (2002) and 
Heim  (2006).  I  will  assume  that  degree  predicates  denote  relations  between 
individuals  and  intervals  (sets  of  degrees),  as  shown  in  (23).  Given  this,  the 
denotation of a degree question will be as in (24): 
 
(23)  [[   tall]] = I<d,t>.  xe. x’s height  I 
(24)  [[  How tall is John? ]]  
w    =  p. I [I DI   p= w’. John’s height  I in w’] 
   ‘For what interval I, John’s height is in I?’ 
 
Now the denotation of a degree question that contains a factive predicate can be 
represented as follows: 
 
(25)      [[  *How tall do you regret that you are? ]] 
w= 
 p.  I DI [p=  w’. regret ( w”. your height I  in w’’) (w’)] 
    ‘For what interval I, you regret that your height is in I’  
                                                            
4The idea to use the interval semantics for degrees was originally suggested to me by Benjamin 
Spector (pc.) in the context of negative islands, cf. also Section 3.2 and Abrusán and Spector 
(2008).  
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Observe that any domain of degrees that has at least 2 degrees in it
5 will contain 
two non-overlapping intervals, which can be pictured as follows. 
 
(26)  ---------[---------]1-------------[----------]2--------------- 
 
Given  the  universal  projection  pattern,  the  question  stands  with  the  following 
presupposition: 
 
(27)  Presupposition of (25):  I DI: you believe( w’.your height I in w’) (w) 
        ‘you believe your height to be contained in every interval’ 
 
However,  since  the  domain  of  degrees  always  contains  two  non-overlapping 
intervals,  this  presupposition  amounts  to  requiring  that  the  subject  have  a 
contradictory set of beliefs, because it is not possible that someone’s height be 
contained  in  two  non-overlapping  intervals.  Since  the  question  stands  with  a 
contradictory  presupposition,  it  is  infelicitous  in  any  context  and  hence 
unacceptable. A similar problem arises in the case of the narrow scope reading of 
how many questions, but not in the case of the wide scope reading. As I show in 
Abrusán (2007) this is why in the case of how many questions that contain a 
factive verb only the wide scope reading is available.
6  
 
2.4.  Extensions 
 
In this section I argue that the reasoning presented above for factive verbs can be 
extended  to  certain  islands  created  by  extraposition  and  certain  adverbial 
interveners as well as some quasi-factive verbs (part-time triggers).  
 
2.4.1.  Extraposition and factives seem to belong to the same class of interveners 
(cf.  also Honcoop 1998). This is because whether or not  extraposition creates 
weak  islands  depends  on  the  factivity  of  the  verb/noun  involved  in  the 
construction. When the extraposition is based on a noun/adjective that triggers a 
factive inference, the extraposition creates a weak island context. However, on the 
occasions  that  extraposition  is  not  based  on  an  adjective  that  has  a  factive 
inference, it does not give rise to weak islands either. The example in (28) below 
clearly stands with a factive inference that (the speaker believes that) p: 
 
                                                            
5I assume that if a domain of degrees only has a single degree in it, the question will be infelicitous 
since it will always denote a tautology.  
6It has been argued that the class of verbs that create weak islands also includes response stance 
verbs, e.g. deny, verify, admit, confirm, accept, acknowledge (cf. Szabolcsi and Zwarts 1993 and 
references therein). These verbs might be argued to be presuppositional in the sense that they 
“presuppose that their complements express assumptions or claims held by someone possibly other 
than the speaker which are part of the common ground” (Honcoop 1998: 167). Unfortunately, the 
fact that these verbs should create weak islands is not predicted by the present account. This is 
because the existential quantifier in the presupposition it should obviate the island effect. I suspect 
that the problem has to do with the notoriously complex and often problematic interaction of 
presupposition projection with existential quantification. Yet, a detailed analysis of this issue will 
have to wait for another occasion.  
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(28)  It was a surprise that John behaved politely 
presupposes: (the speaker believes that) John behaved politely 
 
Accordingly, the question based on this extraposition structure is predicted to be 
an island violation, which is indeed the case as shown by the example below: 
 
(29)  *How was it a surprise that John behaved? 
 
The reasoning of course is the same as the one presented for factive verbs in the 
previous  section:  the  question  is  predicted  presuppose  the  conjunction  of  the 
presuppositions of the alternatives in the H/K denotation. However, as we have 
seen  above,  this  set  will  always  contain  propositions  that  are  mutually 
incompatible. Hence the set of presuppositions that the question stands with is 
always incoherent, therefore the question cannot be asked in any context.  
In  contrast,  observe  that  certain  other  structures  that  can  be  classified 
syntactically  as  belonging  to  the  class  of  extrapositions,  do  not  stand  with  a 
factive inference
7: 
 
(30)  a.  It is possible that John behaved politely.  
                   does not presuppose that John behaved politely 
   b.  It is dangerous for youngsters to drink wine at the party. 
                   does not presuppose that youngsters drink wine at the party. 
 
Correspondingly, as one can observe by looking at the examples in (31) below, 
such extrapositions do not induce weak islands either.  
 
(31)  a.  How is it possible that John behaved? 
 b. How much wine is it dangerous to drink at a party?  
 
The questions above are acceptable, as predicted by the present theory, because 
they do not stand with any conflicting presuppositions, in fact probably they do 
not trigger any presupposition at all. 
 
2.4.2.    If the intervention by factive verbs and (factive) extraposition islands is 
indeed the result of the factive inference, we should find cases where the presence 
or absence of this inference correlates with the island creating behavior of the 
intervener.  We  do  indeed  find  such  examples  in  the  case  of  certain  adverbial 
interveners  which  might  trigger  a  factive-like  inference  in  some  but  not  other 
contexts. When the lexical content together with the context suggests a factive 
inference, we observe island inducing behavior, but not otherwise.  
Pertinent examples are provided by the adverbial interveners such as fast 
                                                            
7The one exception in the literature to the above claim is the following example: 
(3)  *How is it time to behave?  
I do not have an explanation for this fact. Also, modal obviation seems for some reason to be 
harder in the case of extraposition islands, cf. e.g. ???How was it a surprise that John was allowed 
to behave? 
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or twice.  In these cases the presence or absence of the factive inference correlates 
with the island creating behavior of the intervener. This also means that I propose 
that adverbial interveners in fact belong to the group of presuppositional islands. 
This is in contrast with most (indeed, all) of the literature on this topic, who claim 
that  (quantificational)  adverbial  interveners  argue  for  treating  weak  island 
intervention  in  terms  of  scope  (e.g.  Kiss  1993,  de  Swart  1992,  Szabolcsi  and 
Zwarts  1993,  Honcoop  1998).  However,  I  believe  that  rather  than  scope 
restrictions, the real culprit is again presuppositions. Simons (2001) and Schlenker 
(2006)  note  that  adverbs  give  rise  to  “quasi-presuppositions”,  i.e.  in  some 
circumstances they create inferences that project in a presupposition-like fashion: 
 
(32)  Bill ran fast            Inference: Bill ran 
 
The  projection  properties  of  this  inference  seem  to  pattern  with  that  of  real 
presuppositions, at least in some circumstances, which argues that the inference is 
indeed a presupposition, (cf. Chemla 2007): 
 
(33)  a.  None of these ten boys ran fast 
      Inference: all of these ten boys ran 
 b.  None of these ten boys solved the exercise twice. 
   Inference: all of these ten boys solved the exercise 
 
However, not all adverbs seem to behave in the same way: the adverb carefully, 
e.g. seems to project rather weakly, if at all: 
 
(34)  None of these ten boys searched the bags carefully 
     ??? everyone searched the bags 
 
The curious fact that we can observe now is that the projection facts above seem 
to correlate with the island inducing behavior of the adverbs above. In particular, 
observe  that  quantificational  adverbs  such  as  twice  and  adverbs  such  as  fast, 
which  seemed  to  stand  with  a  factive  presupposition  above,  are  also  robust 
interveners in split constructions (cf. de Swart 1992).  
 
(35)  a.   *Combien as-tu beaucoup/souvent/peu/rarement consulté de livres?   
       How many have you a lot/often/a little/ rarely consulted of books 
b.  *Combien Marie a-t-elle vite mangé de gateaux? 
       How many Marie has-she fast ate of cakes 
 
However,  the  adverb  carefully  e.g.,  which  shows  a  weak  presuppositional 
behavior, does not induce a weak island effect (cf. Obenauer 1984): 
 
(36)  ?Combien   le  douanier a-t-il  soigneusement fouillé de valises?    
   How-many the customs-officer has-he carefully searched the suitcases 
 
It seems then that quantificational adverbs and some other adverbs like late, fast, 
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etc. are more prone to triggering a “quasi-presupposition” than other adverbs: e.g. 
carefully  does  not  seem  to  trigger  a  presupposition  in  the  same  fashion. 
Consequently, the former but not the latter seem to provoke intervention. The 
difference that we can observe between the various adverbs is probably triggered 
not so much by the particular adverbs themselves, but rather by the interaction of 
the  context  and  the  content  of  the  whole  sentence.  And  while  such  “quasi-
presuppositions”  are  not  yet  well  understood,  given  their  (quasi-)  factive 
inference, the explanation why wh-constructions that contain adverbs are sensitive 
to weak islands is very similar to what we have seen above in the case of factive 
and extraposition islands. Further, as adverbs do not seem to be uniform in the 
strength of the quasi-presupposition they invoke, this analysis has the ability to 
predict a certain amount of variation with respect to individual adverbs, which is a 
welcome result.  
 
 
3.  Negative Islands 
 
This section sketches an explanation for the oddness of negative islands, such as 
(37a) and (37b). These examples contrast with the one in (37c), which shows that 
a wh-word ranging over individuals can escape negation without any problems. 
    
(37)  a.  *How didn’t John behave at the party? 
b.  *How many children doesn’t John have? 
c.  Who didn’t John invite to the party? 
 
I propose that the reason for the unacceptability of (37a) and (37b) is that they 
cannot have a maximally informative true answer
8. Dayal (1996) has argued that a 
question presupposes that there is a single most informative true proposition in the 
Karttunen denotation of the question, i.e. a proposition that entails all the other 
true  answers  to  the  question.  I  show  that  in  the  case  of  negative  manner  and 
degree  questions  Dayal’s  (1996)  presupposition  can  never  be  met.  As  a 
consequence, any complete answer to these questions will amount to the statement 
of a contradiction.  
In  the  case  of  manner  questions  the  intuitive  idea  as  for  why  these 
questions  are  bad  is  very  simple:  the  domain  of  manners  contains  contrary 
predicates,  such  as fast,  slow,  medium  speed,  etc.  However,  as  the  domain  of 
manners  is  structured  in  such  a  way  that  the  predicates  themselves  are  in 
opposition with each other, in the case of negative questions it will turn out to be 
impossible  to  select  any  proposition  in  the  denotation  of  negative  manner 
questions as the most informative true proposition.  In the case of negative degree 
questions  I  argue  that  the  maximization  failure  is  predicted  if  we  assume  an 
interval-based semantics of degree constructions.  
 
 
                                                            
8This assumption I share with Fox and Hackl (2007). Further, this idea also related at an abstract 
level to the reasoning in Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993), cf. Abrusán (2008). 
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3.1.  Negative Islands Created by Manner Adverbials and Their Obviation 
 
Recall  that  contraries  cannot  be  simultaneously  true,  but  they  can  be 
simultaneously false. The fact that they can be simultaneously false means that for 
any pair of contraries, there will always be a set of events that do not belong to 
either. We might now further propose then that this set of events is itself a manner 
predicate. In other words for any pair of a predicate P and a contrary of it, P’, 
there is a middle-predicate P
M such that at least some of the events that are neither 
in  P  or  P’  are  in  P
M.    (38)  summarizes  the  full  conditions  on  the  domain  of 
manners:  
 
(38)  Manners denote functions from events to truth values. The set of manners 
(DM) in a context C is a subset of  [{f | E {1,0}}= (E)] that satisfies the 
following conditions: 
i.  for each predicate of manners P DM, there is at least one contrary 
predicate of manners P’ DM, such that P and P’ do not overlap: 
P P’ = .  
ii.  for each pair  (P, P’), where P is a manner predicate and P’is a 
contrary of P, and P DM and P’ DM, there is a set of events  P
M 
 DM,  such  that  for  every  event  e  in  P
M   DM   [ e P   DM    & 
e P’ DM]. 
 
Given this, now we will say that the context might implicitly restrict the domain 
of manners, just as the domain of individuals, but for any member in the set  {P, 
P’, P
M}, the other two members are alternatives to it in any context. Observe 
further the surprising fact that the sentences in (39) below are odd:  
 
(39)  a.   #John did not run fast and slowly 
             b.  #John did not reply wisely and unwisely 
 
I  propose  that  the  reason  for  this  oddness  is  that  it  is  the  presupposition  on 
forming  plural  manner  predicates  {p1,p2}  that  p1 p2 0,  and  therefore  e.g.  the 
plural manner fast and  slow is a presupposition failure since it is not possible for 
a running event to be both fast and slow at the same time, hence a plural manner 
cannot be formed. In fact this condition might be connected to a more general 
requirement that a plurality is only well formed if possible
9.  
  The reason for the ungrammaticality of questions like (37a), in contrast 
with  (37c)  is  that  there  cannot  be  a  maximally  informative  true  answer  to  a 
negative  question  about  manners.  Why?  Let’s  look  first  at  positive  questions 
about manners. As I have suggested above, in any given context, the domain of 
manners might be restricted, but for any predicate of events p, its contrary p’ and 
the middle-predicate p
M will be among the alternatives in the H/K set. Suppose 
that the context restricts the domain of manners to the dimension of wisdom. Now 
the H/K-denotation of (40) will contain at least the propositions in (40): 
                                                            
9Cf. Spector (2007) and  Szabolcsi and Haddican (2004) for related proposals. 
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(40)  a.  How did John behave? 
 b.  {that John behaved wisely, that John behaved unwisely,  
  that John behaved neither wisely nor unwisely} 
   
Suppose that John indeed behaved wisely. Given that the three alternatives are 
exclusive (as contraries cannot be simultaneously true), this means that the event 
in question (e*) is an element of the set of events denoted by wisely, and not an 
element of any other set. Since in this case this is the only true proposition in the 
H/K set, Dayal’s (1996) presupposition is satisfied. Note that if  we had more 
propositions in the Hamblin set, ranging over e.g. the manners wisely, politely, 
and their contraries respectively, as well as the plural manners that can be formed 
from  these,  the  situation  would  be  similar  to  questions  that  range  over  both 
singular  and  plural  individuals.  Suppose  that John  in  fact  behaved  wisely  and 
politely: given the distributive interpretation of plural predicates
10 this will entail 
that he behaved wisely and that he behaved politely, and imply that he did not 
behave in any other way. 
Let’s  look  now  at  a  negative  question.  First  imagine  that  our  context 
restricts the domain to the dimension of wiseness.  
 
(41)  a.  *How didn’t  John behave? 
 b.   p.  q        [p= w’.                         ¬                   
 c. {that John did not behave wisely, that John did not behave unwisely,       
                                 that John did not behave neither wisely nor unwisely} 
 
Suppose that John did not behave wisely was the most informative true answer. 
This would mean that the only set of events among our alternatives which does 
not contain the event in question (e*) is the set of wise events. Hence the event in 
question is both a member of the set of events denoted by unwisely, and the set of 
events denoted by neither wisely not unwisely. Yet, this cannot be true, because 
these  two  sets  are  exclusive  by  definition.  Therefore  this  cannot  be  the  most 
informative  true  answer  to  (41).  What  about  an  answer  such  as John  did  not 
behave  wisely and unwisely? This answer is ruled out by the presupposition that 
excludes the formation of incoherent plural manners. The predicates wisely and 
unwisely  are  contraries,  and  therefore  they  cannot  form  a  plural  manner.  (As 
mentioned above, this is also the reason why the sentence itself is odd.) Therefore 
the proposition that John did not behave wisely and unwisely is not in the set of 
alternatives and therefore it cannot be the most informative true answer. It is easy 
to see that if we had more alternatives, e.g. the alternatives based on wiseness and 
politeness, (i.e. wisely, med-wisely, unwisely, politely, impolitely, med-politely and 
the acceptable pluralities that can be formed based on these) the situation would 
be similar: Any answer that contains only one member of each triplet leads to 
contradiction, and any answer that contains more than one member of each triplet 
                                                            
10I assume that plural manner predicates combine with a distributive operator. Notice that this 
operator carries a homogeneity presupposition, which is crucial in the case of negative questions. 
(4)  D (PPL)= e: [ p PPL   p(e)] or [ p PPL   ¬p(e)].   p PPL   p(e). 
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is a presupposition failure. There is no way out, no maximal answer can be given. 
Notice also that in the case of questions about individuals a similar problem does 
not arise and therefore there is no obstacle for there being a maximal answer to 
these questions. For this reason, we predict the question in (37c) to be acceptable. 
  It should be noted that given the similarity of selecting a complete answer 
to definite descriptions, the above account predicts that definite descriptions such 
as (42) should be also unacceptable: 
 
(42)  #the way in which John didn’t behave. 
  
This  prediction  is  indeed  borne  out.  The  reason  is  of  course  that  there  is  no 
maximum among the various manners in which John did not behave
11.  
Recall  the  observation  of  Fox  and  Hackl  (2007),  who  have  noted  that 
negative islands can be saved by inserting existential modals below negation or by 
inserting universal modals above negation. These are indeed predicted to be good 
in our system. Notice that unlike before, we are not talking about a specific event 
any  more,  but  the  event  is  existentially  quantified  over.  The  existential 
quantification is presumably provided by the existential modal. 
 
(43)  [[  How is John not allowed to behave? ]] 
w 
= p.          [p= w’.¬ w”Acc(w’,w”). e[behave        J                    
 
Suppose we restricted the domain to the dimension of politeness. As before, the 
set  of  alternatives  will  at  least  include  three  contrary  predicates:  politely, 
impolitely and neither politely nor impolitely. There is no obstacle in this case for 
choosing a most informative answer. This is because it might be the case e.g. that 
impolitely is indeed the only manner in which John is not allowed to behave, and 
in every other manner he is allowed to behave. In other words the contradiction is 
resolved  by  distributing  predicates  over  different  worlds  and  events.  Since 
universal  modals  above  negation  are  equivalent  to  existential  modals  below 
negation, the same reasoning holds for such examples as well. Further, the same 
reasoning can also be extended to the fact that attitude verbs above negation also 
obviate negative islands since attitude verbs are standardly analyzed as involving 
universal quantification over possible worlds.  
 
                                                            
11One might wonder why it is that the examples below do not make the negative manner questions 
grammatical: 
(5)  A:  *How didn’t John behave? 
               B:   Politely, e.g. 
               B’:  Not politely. 
I believe that this apparent problem is in fact part of a larger issue of the impenetrability of the 
linguistic system for non-linguistic reasoning, or reasoning based on common knowledge. As the 
requirement of the linguistic system is that there be a most informative true answer to the question, 
in the rare cases where this leads to a contradiction, we cannot access and recalibrate the rules for 
the felicity conditions on a question.  
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3.2.  Negative Islands with Degree Questions and Their Obviation 
 
The proposal in this section is based on a suggestion made by Benjamin Spector 
(pc.) to use a degree semantics based on intervals (cf. also Abrusán and Spector 
2008).  Such  an  account  of  degree  constructions  was  originally  proposed  in 
Schwarzschild  and  Wilkinson  (2002),  and  was  also  adopted  (with  some 
modifications)  by  Heim  (2006).  The  alternative  propositions  now  range  over 
different intervals that could be the argument of the adjective: 
 
(44)  [[  How tall is John? ]] 
w  
=  p. I [I DI   p= w’. John’s height  I in w’] 
‘For what interval I, John’s height is in I?’ 
 
Naturally, there are many intervals for which it is true that John’s height (a point) 
is contained in them. These intervals overlap. I will say that an interval K covers 
interval I, if for every degree d that is an element of I, K contains that element. (In 
other words, I is a subset of K.) It is easy to see then that the truth of John’s height 
 I, will entail the truth of John’s height  K, for every K that covers I. The most 
informative  answer  among  the  true  answers  will  be  the  propositin  about  the 
smallest interval such that John’s height is contained in it. I take it to be a fact of 
the  world  that  John  has  some  height,  therefore  there  will  always  be  a  most 
informative proposition among the true propositions: that John’s height  {dj}. 
In the case of a negative degree question the situation is different. Given 
that the entailment pattern is reversed because of negation, if K covers I, the truth 
of John’s height   K entails the truth of John’s height  I. We are then looking for 
the biggest interval such that John’s height is not contained in it. The problem is 
that there is no such interval.  
 
(45)  [[  *How tall isn’t John? ]] 
w 
=  p. I [I DI   p= w’. ¬John’s height  I in w’] 
‘For what interval I, John’s height is not in I?’ 
 
The reason why there cannot be such an interval is because intervals are always 
convex
12. The intuitive idea can be illlustrated as follows: Suppose for example 
that interval I2  is wholly below dj , while the interval I3 is wholly above dj. It is 
easy to see that there is no maximal interval that covers both of these intervals, but 
does not cover dj.  As long as John has any height in the actual world this situation 
is in fact unavoidable. Indeed it seems to be a presupposition of degree questions 
that the answer is not-zero. In the case of asking about John’s height this is a 
trivial fact about the world. In the case of a question such as How many apples did 
you eat? if no apples were eaten, then a natural answer is the refutation of the 
presupposition: “I did not eat any apples” instead of rather odd “#Zero”. Notice 
that for the reasoning outlined above contextually given levels of granularity do 
not make any difference: any level of granularity will lead to a contradiction, as 
                                                            
12This assumption, strictly speaking, is more restrictive than Heim (2006) or even Schwarzschild 
and Wilkinson (2002), for whom intervals could be simply sets of degrees.  
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long as the domain of degrees contains at least 3 degrees. In other words the scale 
might  be  dense  (as  in  the  case  of  heights,  e.g.)  or  discreet  (as  in  the  case  of 
children), the ungrammaticality of negative degree questions is equally predicted. 
This is in contrast with Fox and Hackl (2007)’s account, who need to assume that 
scales are universally dense. 
As  we  have  seen  above,  certain  quantifiers  can  rescue  negative  degree 
questions.:  
 
(46)  How much radiation are we not allowed to expose our workers to? 
 
The fact that this question should be grammatical is straightforwardly predicted 
by the present account: While with respect to (45) it was a fact about the world 
that John’s height is a single degree, the degrees of radiation that we allow our 
workers to be exposed to might correspond to an interval, e.g. (0, d]. Then any 
interval I wholly above d is such that it is not allowed the the amount of radiation 
that we expose our workers be in I. The strongest true proposition of this form is 
obtained by taking I= (d,  ). Therefore Dayal’s (1996) condition can be met.   
  
3.3.  Explicit Domains 
 
As it was observed by Kroch (1989), negative islands improve if we list potential 
answers, as shown in the example below: 
 
(47)  a.  ?How did you not play chess? 
      A-blindfolded, B-drunk, C-in a bathing suit? 
b.   Among the following, how many points did Iverson not score? 
                  A-20    B-30    C-40   D-50 
 
It seems that what happens in such cases is that the listed answers in fact facilitate 
a reading of the question where it ranges over multiple events. This is also argued 
for by the fact that the question further improves if instead of simple past, the 
tense of the question is the present perfect, and by inserting a particle such as yet.  
 
(48)  How have you not played chess yet? 
A-blindfolded     B-drunk      C-in a bathing suit 
 
Also, notice that if we selected “B” as our answer to (47b) it would imply that 
there were many events of Iverson scoring.  Answer “B” suggests that among the 
alternatives given, B is the only one to which no scoring event corresponds. Why 
does  evoking  multiple  events  ameliorate  negative  islands?  The  reason  is  very 
similar  to  that  described  in  connection  with  modal  obviation.  Since  contrary 
predicates  can  be  distributed  into  different  events,  the  contradiction  can  be 
avoided. Further support for this reasoning comes from cases where the multiple-
event reading is not easily available. In such cases the listing of answers in fact 
does not seem to lead to improvement, as shown below: 
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(49)  a.  *How do you not speak French?  A: very well  B: so-so    C: badly 
b.  #Among the following, how many children don’t you have? 
  A.2    B.3   C.4  D.5 
 
This fact is straightforwardly predicted by the present account, but not by any 
other account. More generally, unlike what is typically assumed in the syntactic 
literature, I propose that there is no single phenomenon of “D-linking” that can 
ameliorate island effects, instead, D-linking can only be understood as cover term 
for a number of unrelated phenomena: (a) the facilitation of multiple events (as 
above), (b) scope phenomena (the two readings of how many questions) and (c) 
identity questions (cf. Section 2.2). 
 
 
4.  Contradiction and Grammaticality 
 
The proposal in this paper rests on the claim that the ungrammaticality of weak 
islands follows from the fact that they lead to a contradiction at some level. In fact 
we  need  to  distinguish  between  contradictions  that  result  from  non-logical 
arguments,  and  contradictions  that  result  from  the  logical  constants  alone. 
Gajewski (2002) argues that the second in fact plays an important role for natural 
language: sentences that express a contradiction or tautology by virtue of their 
logical constants are ungrammatical. The present proposal falls under Gajewski’s 
(2002) generalization in that it can be showed that the weak island violations lead 
to a contradiction due to logical constants alone (cf. discussion in Abrusán 2007). 
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